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ARGUMENT 
The State at best exalts form over substance, and at worst 
misleads the Court by arguing that petitioner's appeal should be 
denied for focussing only on the Veterinary Board and 
Administrative Law Judge's Findings and Conclusions rather than on 
the Department's Order on Review. This argument overlooks the fact 
that the only factual findings which have been made were made at an 
evidentiary hearing before the Veterinary Board, which Findings and 
Conclusions were adopted by the Division and affirmed in toto by 
the Department. Any challenge to factual sufficiency such as here, 
must necessarily be directed at the substantive factual findings 
and legal conclusions. In fact, the Petition for Review is of the 
Department's Order adopting the Findings and Conclusions of the 
Veterinary Board. Because petitioner has exhausted his 
administrative remedies, he is entitled to be heard before this 
Court on all issues presented. 
Petitioner has also carried its marshalling burden, in that it 
has successfully marshalled the evidence in support of the 
Department's findings, and has established that notwithstanding 
this evidence, the Department's findings are not supported by 
substantial record evidence. 
Petitioner has adequately preserved the issues of due process 
and substantial evidence as those issues relate to the Division's 
findings of aggravating circumstances. On administrative review, 
1 
the Department was confronted with both issues, as evidenced by the 
Order on Review. Accordingly, petitioner has adequately preserved 
the issues for review. 
I. TAYLOR HAS PROPERLY CHALLENGED THE DEPARTMENT'S ORDER ON 
REVIEW. 
The rule governing judicial review of final agency action 
provides that ff[a] party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of 
final agency action . . . . If Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(l) (Supp. 
1996)• Related to this provision is R151-46b-14 of the Utah 
Administrative Code. This provision sets forth the rule that an 
aggrieved party may only seek judicial review after other 
administrative remedies are exhausted. See Utah Administrative 
Code R151-46b-14(1) (1996). In this regard, judicial review is 
justified once there has been final agency action. See R151-46b-
14(2) (1996). Thus, in accordance with section 63-46b-14(1), 
judicial review of an agency decision is allowed once an order on 
review has been issued by the particular agency. 
In this case, Dr. Taylor has fully complied with these 
provisions, insofar as he has exhausted his administrative remedies 
in challenging the findings and conclusions of the Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing, which have been affirmed 
by the Department of Commerce in their entirety. Now that a final 
order on review has been issued by the Department of Commerce, Dr. 
Taylor is now entitled to have his case judicially reviewed by this 
Court. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14 (1) . 
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The State contends that Dr. Taylor's brief on appeal makes no 
mention of the Department's Order on Review, and only focusses on 
the Division's findings and conclusions. This argument misses the 
point of Dr. Taylor's appeal. 
As is apparent from his appellate brief, a significant issue 
on appeal in this case concerns the argument that the Division's 
Findings of Fact are not supported by substantial evidence. These 
findings are the identical findings made by the Board, and 
subsequently adopted by the Director of the Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing. These findings were then 
"incorporated as the findings of the Executive Director11 in the 
Department's Order on Review affirming the Division's Order. 
Significantly, Dr. Taylor challenges the findings of the Department 
incorporated in its Order on Review. As the Veterinary Board's 
Findings and Conclusions are the substantive facts and law applied, 
any challenge must of necessity be directed at that document. The 
State's tortured argument otherwise, at best, seeks to exalt form 
over substance. 
II. DR. TAYLOR HAS SUFFICIENTLY MARSHALLED THE EVIDENCE IN THIS 
CASE, AND THUS SUCCESSFULLY CHALLENGED THE DIVISION'S FINDINGS 
OF FACT. 
In order to successfully challenge the agency's findings of 
fact, an aggrieved party has the burden of marshalling "all of the 
evidence supporting the findings and show[ing] that despite the 
supporting facts, and in light of the conflicting or contradictory 
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evidence, the findings are not supported by substantial evidence." 
King v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 850 P.2d 1281, 1285 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993). Accord Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 
63, 68 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). See also Heinecke v. Dep't of 
Commerce, 810 P.2d 459, 464 n.7 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (stating 
'substantial evidence viewed in light of the whole record7 test 
does not obviate need to marshal evidence). 
In this case, Dr. Taylor has sufficiently marshalled the 
evidence in support of the findings below, and has established 
that, despite such supporting facts, and in light of the 
conflicting and contradictory evidence, the agency's findings are 
not supported by substantial evidence. The marshalling performed 
by Dr. Taylor in his first brief speaks for itself. Thus, rather 
than perform again its marshalling act, Dr. Taylor seeks in the 
instant brief to reply to the State's arguments concerning Dr. 
Taylor's failure to marshal the evidence. 
Specifically, the State contends that, in marshalling the 
evidence, Dr. Taylor fails to consider his own testimony concerning 
the care and services rendered to Hillary, the English bulldog. In 
regards to the care rendered to Hillary, the only evidence at 
hearing supporting the agency's findings came from the testimony of 
Hillary's owner and Dr. Mayling Chinn.1 
lDr. Chinn is the veterinarian visited by Hillary after she 
was seen at the Brookside Animal Hospital. Her testimony runs 
from pages 150 to 215 of the transcript. 
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The testimony from Hillary's owner indicated that two of the 
pups were delivered before Hillary was brought into the clinic. At 
the clinic, the evidence indicated that Dr. Taylor "felt 
[Hillary's] stomach," examined the puppy that was stillborn and 
explained that the puppies were all premature, and that Hillary was 
passing them fine by herself and no cesarian section would be 
required. (Transcript, 161:5 - 162:15) Other puppies were passed 
at the clinic, but, notwithstanding this, Hillary's owner became 
impatient and took Hillary home where labor continued. (Transcript 
168:4 - 170) Yet another stillborn pup was born at home, 
whereupon, after being unable to contact Dr. Taylor's clinic, the 
owner took Hillary to Dr. Chinn, who removed the remaining 
stillborn pups by way of cesarian section. 
Dr. Chinn testified regarding the propriety of palpating an 
English bulldog to determine the number and size of the litter. In 
her testimony, Dr. Chinn stated that "[p]alpation is always 
something you do on an exam." Dr. Chinn testified, however, that 
if the dog is of a larger breed, then a radiograph is more 
appropriate to determine the number and size of the dog's litter. 
Because no radiograph was taken by Dr. Taylor, Dr. Chinn opined 
that Dr. Taylor's standard of care fell below the accepted 
standard. (Transcript 204:14 to 205:7) This was the only evidence 
regarding Hillary's care supporting the agency's findings. 
The State argues that in marshalling the evidence, Dr. Taylor 
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has failed to draw on examples from his own testimony that support 
the agency's findings of gross negligence and unprofessional 
conduct vis-a-vis Hillary. See State's Brief, at 15 n.2. The 
first example deals with Dr. Taylor's statement that he would have 
performed a cesarian section on Hillary. The second example is Dr. 
Taylor's statement that, given the structure of an English bulldog, 
palpating is not always effective and, therefore, he always offers 
to take an x-ray of the dog. These examples misrepresent Dr. 
Taylor's testimony. In context, Dr. Taylor testified that he did 
not take care of Hillary during her stay at the Brookside Animal 
Clinic. Moreover, the testimony reveals that Dr. Taylor only spoke 
with Hillary's owner on one earlier occasion, and that the 
conversation concerned the scheduling of a cesarian section. 
(Transcript 371:4 - 11) Indeed, Dr. Taylor's testimony concerning 
the palpating of dogs to secure an idea of the number and size of 
the litter, and the limits imposed by the size of particular breeds 
in conducting such palpations, is corroborated by Dr. Chinn, who, 
as explained above, indicated that palpating can be difficult given 
the size of some dogs, and that an x-ray is a more appropriate 
method when larger dogs are involved. This evidence in no way adds 
to the other evidence concerning the care received by Hillary, to 
support the agency's findings. Dr. Taylor's testimony at bottom 
was that he did not treat Hillary. Including his testimony in 
marshalling the evidence will not help the Division as argued in 
6 
their brief. Otherwise, Dr. Taylor relies on the marshalling 
performed in his opening brief, and maintains that he has 
successfully fulfilled his marshalling burden. 
III. PETITIONER HAS ADEQUATELY PRESERVED THE ISSUES RAISED IN HIS 
FIRST BRIEF. 
The State contends that Dr. Taylor has waived his right to 
appeal the issues of due process and substantial evidence, as those 
issues relate to the Division's findings regarding aggravating 
circumstances. 
As the State points out, questions that are not raised below 
in an administrative tribunal are not subject to judicial review, 
except in exceptional circumstances. See Alvin G. Rhodes Pump 
Sales v. Industrial Comm'n, 681 P.2d 1244, 1249 (Utah 1984); 
Brinkerhoff v. Schwendiman, 790 P.2d 587, 589 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
This rule, however, is inapplicable to the facts of this case, and 
contrary to the State's contention, petitioner has adequately 
preserved the issues below. 
To understand Dr. Taylor's preservation of the issues of due 
process and substantial evidence, it is essential to consider the 
issues examined below by the Department together with the issues 
raised by Dr. Taylor on appeal. In the instant case, Dr. Taylor 
challenges the Division's findings of aggravating circumstances, 
including the finding that Dr. Taylor failed to acknowledge the 
wrongful nature of his conduct, or to undertake good efforts to 
restitute or rectify the consequences of his misconduct. Dr. 
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Taylor argues that the Division failed to notify him that such lack 
of contrition, or recalcitrance, might constitute unprofessional 
conduct or aggravate the sanction ultimately imposed. 
Dr. Taylor also argues that the finding of aggravating 
circumstances is not supported by substantial evidence. In this 
regard, Dr. Taylor argues that no record evidence supports such 
findings, and that the only statements that could support such 
findings were made by opposing counsel during closing statements. 
See Appellant's Brief, at 43-44. Those statements do not 
constitute evidence, and were not based on any evidence in the 
record. Thus, the findings of recalcitrance, lack of contrition, 
and failure to rectify or make restitution is not supported by 
substantial evidence. The State's argument, however, as a 
prefatory matter misses the point. Preservation of issues occurs, 
if at all, during the evidentiary phase of a proceeding, not during 
the course of administrative review. As surely as the factual 
issues are found and legal conclusions reached during the course 
and at the conclusion of the evidentiary proceeding, so must a 
record be made by the complaining appellant, if at all, during that 
evidentiary proceeding. Indeed, in this case when Dr. Taylor 
sought review by the administrative agency as a prerequisite to 
filing the instant petition for review, the Department merely 
reviewed the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the 
Veterinary Board, the memoranda of the parties, and without more, 
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affirmed the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. No hearing 
was held, no evidence was taken, and no additional Findings made. 
To follow the State's argument to its logical conclusion with 
respect to the question of the sufficiency of the Division's 
Finding of aggravating circumstances and the impact of that finding 
on Dr. Taylor's due process would be to require Dr. Taylor to 
anticipate during the course of the evidentiary hearing below that 
a factual finding would be made not based on substantial evidence, 
indeed, not based on any evidence at all but merely the statements 
of counsel, and to anticipate that the Division would act in such 
a way as to violate his due process. Dr. Taylor would then have 
been required to produce evidence and sustain the burden of proving 
his contrition and of his due process rights. Similarly, Dr. 
Taylor cannot have waived his right to challenge the inadequacies 
of the substantial evidence supporting the Division's Finding of 
aggravating circumstances or the Veterinary Board's violation of 
his due process, since such right was not at that time known to 
exist. See generally Soters, Inc. v. Deseret Federal Savings & 
Loan Ass'n, 857 P.2d 935 (Utah 1993). 
Moreover, the issues raised by Dr. Taylor in the instant 
appeal were sufficiently preserved below before the Department of 
Commerce. This is evidenced by the Department's Order on Review. 
Several references are made in the Department's Order, relating to 
the Division's definition of "unprofessional conduct," and the 
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challenges made by Dr. Taylor to those definitions. Specifically, 
the Department stated that "[Dr. Taylor] challenges the finding 
that [he] engaged in unprofessional conduct by setting forth the 
proposition that the terms 'gross negligence,' 'gross 
incompetence,' and 'pattern of incompetency or negligence' must be 
defined before they can, in turn, be used to define 'unprofessional 
conduct./M See Order on Review, at 56. Dr. Taylor also asserted 
before the Department that "the terms 'gross incompetence' and 
'gross negligence' are unconstitutionally vague as used in the 
licensing act and are therefore of no legal force or effect upon 
[him]." See Order on Review, at 58. Similarly, Dr. Taylor in the 
instant appeal challenges the failure of the Division to adequately 
define the term "unprofessional conduct" given its failure to 
notify him that recalcitrance and lack of contrition can amount to 
unprofessional conduct. Although not couched exactly in terms used 
below before the Department, Dr. Taylor's argument regarding due 
process in this case should nonetheless be well-taken by this 
Court. See generally Indian Village Trading Post v. Bench, 929 
P. 2d 367, 369 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (regardless of appellee's 
failure to specifically couch issue in exact terms relied upon by 
appellate court in affirming, issue, as couched by appellate court, 
was nonetheless appropriate for review). 
Dr. Taylor argued the specific issue of "substantial evidence" 
before the Department, as that issue relates to the general 
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findings of unprofessional conduct. As stated by the Department, 
"[Dr. Taylor]'s primary argument, or at least most extended 
exposition in his brief, is to the proposition that the findings of 
the Board are either not founded upon substantial evidence or that 
the finding conflicts with evidence [Dr. Taylor] deems more 
substantial in providing support to his contentions." See Order on 
Review, at 9. Like the due process issue, Dr. Taylor in the 
instant appeal challenges the Board's factual findings regarding 
the aggravating circumstances that amount to unprofessional 
conduct. As discussed in his first brief, the only statements made 
in the record which could directly support the Board's findings in 
this regard are the statements of counsel for the Division in his 
closing argument. Although not couched in exactly the same terms 
as found in the Order on Review, the issue was nonetheless 
adequately preserved for the instant appeal. See generally id. at 
369. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioner has adequately challenged the Department's Order on 
Review, and has complied with the statutory language requiring the 
exhaustion of his administrative remedies. Petitioner has also 
successfully marshalled the evidence in this case. The examples 
cited to by the State misrepresent Dr. Taylor's testimony, and do 
not support the Department's findings vis-a-vis Hillary. 
Petitioner has also adequately preserved all issues appealed to 
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this Court. The administrative bodies below have had the 
opportunity to hear the issues as presented by petitioner in the 
instant appeal, and have ruled on those issues. Accordingly, it is 
time for this Court to consider all issues presented by petitioner. 
Respectfully submitted this day of August, 1997. 
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